This article therefore begins by surveying political practices and the reflective accounts to which they gave rise in the classical Greek period of the independent polis. It continues to Hellenistic Greek thinkers before considering the main currents and roles of political philosophy in the Roman republic. While offering a survey of certain developments in the Roman empire, it leaves aside the distinctive contributions made by Jewish and Christian thinkers in that period, and in particular the great upheaval of thought effected by Augustine, who was deeply engaged with classical authors such as Plato and Cicero, but who is one starting point for medieval political philosophy.
The city was the domain of potential collaboration in leading the good life, though it was by the same token the domain of potential contestation should that pursuit come to be understood as pitting some against others. Political theorizing began in arguments about what politics was good for, who could participate in politics, and why, arguments which were tools in civic battles for ideological and material control as well as attempts to provide logical or architectonic frameworks for those battles. Such conflicts were addressed by the idea of justice, which was fundamental to the city as it emerged from the archaic age into the classical period.
Justice was conceived by poets, lawgivers, and philosophers alike as the structure of civic bonds which were beneficial to all rich and poor, powerful and weak alike rather than an exploitation of some by others. So understood, justice defined the basis of equal citizenship and was said to be the requirement for human regimes to be acceptable to the gods. The ideal was that, with justice as a foundation, political life would enable its participants to flourish and to achieve the overarching human end of happiness eudaimonia , expressing a civic form of virtue and pursuing happiness and success through the competitive forums of the city.
Justice, then, depended on treating equals equally, and distributing citizenship and the privileges of officeholding accordingly. This became the major political faultline of the Greek fifth century BCE. Among equals, however defined, the space of the political was the space of participation in decision-making concerning public affairs and actions. That invention of the political what Meier calls The Greek Discovery of Politics was the hallmark of the classical Greek world.
Citizens, whether the few usually the rich or the many including the poorer and perhaps the poorest free adult men , gathered together to conduct public affairs, sharing either by custom, by election, or by lot—the latter seen in Athens as the most democratic, though it was never the sole mechanism used in any Greek democracy—in holding, or holding accountable, the offices for carrying them out. Rhetoric played an important role in shaping those decisions, especially, though not only, in democracies, where discursive norms shaped by the poor majority were hegemonic in public even over the rich Ober At the same time, politics was shaped by the legacy of archaic poetry and its heroic ethos and by the religious cults which included, alongside pan-Hellenic and familial rites, important practices distinct to each city-state.
This was a polytheistic, rather than monotheistic, setting, in which religion was at least in large part a function of civic identity. This broadest sense was initially most evident to the Athenians when they looked at the peculiar customs of Sparta, but Plato taught them to recognize that democratic Athens was as distinctive a regime Schofield 31—43 , one embodying a particular set of ethical goals and practices in its political arrangements. Justice was widely, if not universally, treated as a fundamental constituent of cosmic order.
Some of the physikoi influenced political life, notably a number of the Pythagoreans in southern Italy. Others held themselves aloof from political action while still identifying commonalities or consonances between nature and politics, for example, Democritus of Abdera, whose atomist philosophy comported with a defense of political life, and so of the justice that it required individuals to enact, as being necessary for individual flourishing see e.
This nomos - phusis debate raised a fundamental challenge to the governing intellectual assumptions of the polis , even though the sophists advertised themselves as teaching skills for success within it, a number of them being employed as diplomats by cities eager to exploit their rhetorical abilities.
While it is broadly true to say that Greek political thinkers generally presupposed the importance of justice, in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE many of them also increasingly problematized it. In giving birth to philosophy, the polis also gave birth to a tension between what Aristotle would describe as two lives: the life of politics and the life of philosophy.
Should philosophers act politically and if so, should they engage in ordinary politics in existing regimes, or work to establish new ones , or should they abstain from politics in order to live a life of pure contemplation?
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There was likewise a question as to whether philosophers should think politically: were human affairs worth thinking about in the broadest perspective opened by the study of nature and of the gods? Philosophy might have to address the political but its highest calling soared above it.
This distinctive Greek—and particularly Platonic — outlook must condition any historical understanding of the development of ancient political philosophy. While one influential approach to the history of political thought takes its bearings from what a thinker was trying to do in and by what he or she said or wrote, it is important to recognize that the founders of ancient political philosophy were in part trying to define a new space of doing as philosophizing, independent of ordinary political action.
This is not to say that they did not also have ordinary political intentions, but rather to stress that the invention of political philosophy was also intended as a mode of reflection upon the value of ordinary political life. A humbly born man who refused the lucrative mantle of the sophistic professional teacher, yet attracted many of the most ambitious and aristocratic youth of Athens to accompany him in his questioning of them and their elders as to the nature of the virtues they claimed to possess or understand, he left no philosophical writings.
Socrates seems to have been the first philosopher to treat ethics — as opposed to cosmology and physics—as a distinct area of inquiry. As depicted by Plato, the search for such definitions led invariably to a concern with knowledge of how best to live, as not only one of the conventional virtues in the form of wisdom but also as underpinning, even constituting, them all.
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That elevation of knowledge in turn led Socrates to militate against the practices of rhetoric and judgment which animated the political institutions of Athens—the law-courts, Assembly and Council. The relation between politics and knowledge, the meaning of justice as a virtue, the value of the military courage which all Greek cities prized in their citizens, all seem to have been central topics of Socratic conversation. That engagement with political philosophy was dramatically intensified when Socrates was, at the age of seventy, arraigned, tried, and sentenced to death by an Athenian popular jury.
Each of these had a political dimension, given the civic control of central religious cults mentioned earlier, and the broad political importance of educating the young to take their place in the civic order. Socrates had played his part as an ordinary citizen, allowing his name to go forward for selection by lot to serve on the Council, and serving in the army when required. He went so far as to claim that as a civic benefactor, he deserved not death but the lifelong publicly provided meals commonly awarded to an Olympic champion 36e—37a.
Socrates here depicts himself as a new kind of citizen, conceptualizing the public good in a new way and so serving it best through unprecedented actions, in contrast to the conventionally defined paths of political contest and success Villa The third is a hypothetical remark. Particularly in twentieth-century Anglophone scholarship, these remarks have engendered a view of Socrates as endorsing civil disobedience in certain circumstances, and so have framed the question of civil disobedience and the grounds for political obligation as arising in Plato. A significant debate on these matters took shape in the United States in the s and s at the time of widespread civil disobedience relating to civil rights and the Vietnam War: see for example Konvitz , Woozley That debate has had to confront the fact that Socrates did not actually disobey his own death sentence with which his trial concluded: when the time came, he drank the poisonous hemlock as prescribed by the jury.
He begins his examination of them by recalling principles to which he and Crito had in the past agreed, including the principle that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it Cri. The meaning of this clause and its relevance to civil disobedience is again much debated Kraut remains a landmark. The Crito depends upon a notion of justice and injustice which it never defines. In the Republic , by contrast, a dialogue in which Socrates is also the main character and first-person narrator but in which the views he advances go beyond the tight-knit pattern of debates in the dialogues discussed in section 3.
See the entry on Plato. The Republic is, with the Laws , an order of magnitude longer than any other Platonic dialogue. Readers today are likely to think of the Republic as the home par excellence of political philosophy. But that view has also been challenged by scholars who see it as primarily an ethical dialogue, driven by the question of why the individual should be just Annas This section argues that the ethical and political concerns, and purposes, of the dialogue are inextricably intertwined.
Near the beginning of the dialogue, a challenge is launched by the character Thrasymachus, mentioned above, asserting that all actual cities define justice so as to serve the advantage of the rulers.
Ancient Political Philosophy
He takes this to mean that the laws which their subjects are bound to obey and the associated ethical virtue of justice which they are enjoined to cultivate traditionally seen as the necessary bond among citizens and the justification for political rule , in fact amount to a distorted sham. See the entry on Callicles and Thrasymachus. Socrates then launches a speculation as to the origins of cities: the city is held to have an existence independently of ethical concerns, coming into being for economic reasons and immediately needing to defend itself in war and also to be able to make offensive war for economic gain.
However, this origin already gives rise to a proto-ethical dimension, first insofar as the members of the primitive city each do their own work the structure of what will emerge as the virtue of justice , which is fleshed out when political rulers are established who are able to use their wisdom to help their subjects maintain a psychological balance in their souls that approximates, if it does not fully embody, the virtues of moderation and justice and so enables them to enjoy a unified rather than a divided soul.
The question of why the individual should be just, figured at the outset by the contrast with the putatively happy tyrant, is resolved eventually by demonstrating that the tyrant will necessarily, in virtue of the disorder of his soul, be at once maximally unjust and maximally unhappy. That resolution rests on the division of the soul into three parts by which the Republic places moral psychology at the heart of political philosophy.
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In the soul and city respectively, the rational part or class should rule; the spirited part or class should act to support the rule of that rational part; and the appetitive part of the soul and producing class in the city should accept being governed by it. Both soul and city are therefore in need of, and capable of exhibiting, four virtues e—a. Two of these pertain to individual parts: the rational part being capable of wisdom, the spirited part of courage. A just soul will indeed reliably issue in traditionally just actions, such as refraining from theft, murder, and sacrilege contra Sachs , who argues that Plato has simply abandoned the usual domain of justice.
To be a truly effective, because wholly unified, agent, one must be just, moderate, courageous and wise. The just person enjoys psychic health, which is advantageous no matter how he is treated fairly or unfairly by gods and men; correspondingly, the just society enjoys civic unity, which is advantageous in being the fundamental way to avoid the assumed supreme evil of civil war.
In contrast, all other cities are characterized as riven by civil war between the rich and the poor; none of them counts as a single, unified city at all see Rep.
auto-class23.ru/includes/joz-plaquenil-preis-online.php In particular, Book V of the Republic suggests that a sufficiently unified regime can be achieved only by depriving its guardian-rulers of private property and of private families, instead making them live in austere communal conditions in which they are financially supported by their money-making subjects and allowed to procreate only when and with whom will best serve the city. In Book II of his Politics , Aristotle would read this prescription as applying to all the citizens in the city envisaged in the Republic , and both he and, later on, Cicero would deplore what they construed as this abolition of private property.
Even those following and radicalizing Plato precisely by advocating the abolition of property for all the citizens, rather than only deprivation of it for the rulers, as would the sixteenth-century Sir Thomas More, were generally opposed to if not also scandalized by the suggestion of procreative communism. The Republic initiates a further tradition in political philosophy by laying out a template for the integration of ethics and political philosophy into a comprehensive account of epistemology and metaphysics. In the Republic , the knowledge required for rule is not specialized, but comprehensive: the knowledge of the good and the Forms is somehow to translate into an ability to make laws as well as the everyday decisions of rule.
The rulers are philosophers who take turns over their lifetime in exercising collective political authority. To that extent the Republic presents a paradox: if it is widely considered the first major work of political philosophy, [ 8 ] it is nevertheless a work in which there is no special content to political knowledge nor any special vocation for politics. In the Statesman , Plato turns his attention to precisely the topics identified at the end of the last section above.
The discussion is interrupted but ultimately enriched by a story or myth in which politics is shown to be a matter of humans ruling other humans in place of living under divine guidance. That human expertise of statecraft is ultimately distinguished by its knowledge of the correct timing kairos as to when its closest rivals should be exercised: these are three forms of expertise that in fact corresponded to key political roles, some of them formal offices, in Greek cities at the time, namely, rhetoric, generalship, and judging Lane , Lane c.
The statesman is wholly defined by the possession of that knowledge of when it is best to exercise these and the other subordinate forms of expertise, and by the role of exercising that knowledge in binding or weaving the different groups of citizens together, a knowledge which depends on a broader philosophical grasp but which is peculiarly political El Murr Here, political philosophy operates not just to assimilate politics to a broader metaphysical horizon but also to identify its specificity. The Statesman also raises an important question about the nature and value of rule by law, as opposed to rule by such expert knowledge as embodied in a rare and likely singular individual.